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The Entrepreneurial Self and ‘Youth
at-risk’: Exploring the Horizons of
Identity in the Twenty-first Century
Peter Kelly
This paper argues that a particular form of Selfhood has come to dominate the horizons
of identity in the Western democracies at this time*/I refer to this form of personhood as
the entrepreneurial Self. The paper argues that the figure (population) of ‘Youth at-risk’,
in its negativity, illuminates the positivity that is the entrepreneurial Self. That is, the
discourses that construct Youth at-risk reveal the truths about whom we should, as
adults, become. The paper engages with Foucault’s theories of government, of
(Neo)Liberalism as a problematisation of the practise of Liberal welfare government,
and of the ways in which certain psychological discourses articulate with (Neo)Liberal
views of enterprise to produce a view of the Self as the entrepreneurial Self.
Introduction
In Rethinking Youth Johanna Wyn and Rob White (1997) problematise the concept of
‘Youth at-risk’, and the consequences that emerge for Youth, as a population and a
concept, as a result of the widespread use of this way of categorising young people.
One of the points that they make at the end of their discussion is that contemporary
uncertainties with regard to employment, gender relations and relationships
generally, class relations and the nature of identity, challenge the narrative of
‘adulthood as a point of arrival’. Indeed, they argue, ‘taken-for-granted’ under-
standings of adulthood are being ‘undermined’ (Wyn & White 1997, p. 148). In
this paper I want to pick up on this suggestion that taken-for granted adulthood is
being undermined. Rather than adopt a nostalgic disposition to this reality I want
to suggest that taken-for-granted adulthood is, indeed, being problematised and
Correspondence to: Peter Kelly, Head, Behavioural Studies, School of Political Social Inquiry, Faculty of Arts,
Monash University, 900 Dandenong Road, Caulfield East, Victoria 3145, Australia. Email Peter.Kelly@arts.
monash.edu.au
ISSN 1367-6261 (print)/ISSN 1469-9680 (online) # 2006 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13676260500523606
Journal of Youth Studies
Vol. 9, No. 1, February 2006, pp. 17/32
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
6:5
1 0
2 O
cto
be
r 2
01
1 
re-imagined in terms of an entrepreneurial Self, and that the terrain of Youth at-risk
is one space in which this form of personhood might be illuminated and re-imagined.
In this discussion I want to argue that the population of Youth at-risk, in its
negativity, illuminates the positivity that is the entrepreneurial Self. That is, the
discourses that construct Youth at-risk reveal the truths about whom we should, as
adults, become. To tell this story I will engage with Foucault’s theories of government,
of (Neo)Liberalism as a problematisation of the practise of Liberal welfare
government, and of the ways in which certain psychological discourses articulate
with (Neo)Liberal views of enterprise to produce a view of the Self as the
entrepreneurial Self. (Neo)Liberalism emerges, not only as a means of governing
the State, the economy, and civil society, but also as a means of governing in these
domains via the rational , autonomous , responsible behaviours and dispositions of a
free , prudent , active Subject: a Subject we can identify as the entrepreneurial Self. I
will argue that in these settings the Self emerges as but one of a number of
entrepreneurial projects in which persons should be engaged*/reflexively, continu-
ously, endlessly, for the term of our natural life . The entrepreneurial Self is an adult
subject; a subject made capable of conducting himself/herself as an enterprise via the
vast ensemble of experiences, practices and relations that characterise the processes of
governmental self formation (Dean 1995a,b) that constitute an institutionalised
biography (Childhood/Youth/Adulthood).
I will suggest that the management of the uncertainties and instability associated
with young people’s transitions from childhood to adulthood that have emerged in
the past three decades illustrate a number of tendencies in the ways in which the
problems of government in the Liberal democracies are being re-imagined. These
problems are being re-imagined in ways that move beyond a Liberal welfare
governmentality that imagined the possibility of a collective form of insurance
against the range of risks associated with industrial modernity. Increasingly, solutions
to these problems of government are imagined as residing in the capacity of various
authorities to develop in individuals a particular ethics of the self*/a form of
personhood we can describe as the entrepreneurial Self, and a form of personhood
that sees individuals as being responsible for conducting themselves, in the business of
life , as an enterprise, a project, a work in progress. This reading attempts an analysis
of the ‘conditions of possibility’ that enable this ‘fiction’ of the entrepreneurial Self to
function as a truth (Walkerdine 1997), this story of what it means to be human to
dominate the ‘horizons of identity’ (Dean 1995a,b) in many Western settings at the
turn of the twenty-first century.
(Neo)Liberal Governmentalities: The Emergence of the Entrepreneurial Self
When we take [a] larger view of what it means to be an entrepreneur, we realize that
we are talking about skills, attitudes, and disciplines everybody needs nowadays*/
qualities it takes to succeed in every field of work. We live in an entrepreneurial
universe of franchise businesses, contract work, combinations of full and part-time
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jobs, self-employed professionals, and professional partnerships. Today, the average
person changes jobs, even fields of work, six times over the course of a lifetime. The
boundary between a company job and self-employment is becoming blurred. No
matter how much talent and training we have, we can no longer simply assume the
job system is going to look after us.
This kind of work environment requires all of us to think in an entrepreneurial way
about who we are and what we are doing. We need to apply entrepreneurial, self-
directive, self-promoting, me-incorporated thinking to every aspect of our lives*/
our participation in learning activities, the way we manage our careers, our finances
and investments, how we market ourselves, our ability to treat our lives as business
enterprises. An entrepreneurial perspective can help us become more adept at the
business of life. (Your Business Network 2000)
In his later genealogies on power and the Subject, Foucault (1978, 1983, 1985, 1986,
1988, 1991) argued that Liberalism, understood not as a philosophy or coherent
theory of government, but as a series of solutions to various problems of government,
emerged, partly, in relation to ‘mercantilism’ and the ‘science of police’ (Foucault
1991, p. 96). Rose argues that Liberalism ‘repudiates’ the ‘megalomaniac and
obsessive fantasy of a totally administered society’ (1996a, p. 43). Instead, within this
emerging art of government, the State must confront certain new realities. These
seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century realities can be situated in relation to the
intellectual and philosophical project of the Scottish Enlightenment, the emerging
institutional forms of modernity (Giddens 1990) and revolutionary moments, and
movements, in Europe and the Americas. Liberal government in these transformed
material and discursive spaces is faced with subjects endowed with rights and
interests that are imagined as existing outside the legitimate realm of the political.
Moreover, these various realms*/the social, the private, the market, civil society*/
cannot be governed ‘by the exercise of sovereign will’ because the State lacks ‘the
requisite knowledge and capacities’ to achieve these diverse ends. Instead, within
emerging Liberal governmentalities various forms and practices of regulation are
reconfigured with the object of ensuring that these domains ‘function to the benefit
of the nation as a whole’ (Rose 1996a, p. 44).
Governmentality theorists argue that the late nineteenth century and the first half
of the twentieth century witnessed various transformations in the ways in which
Liberal governmentalities imagined the problems and art of government. These
transformations witnessed the emergence of the notion of social welfare as a
rationality of government that would seek to ‘social-ize’ aspects of individual and
collective life in the hope of a greater degree of ‘collective security’ (Rose 1996a,
p. 48). Rose argues that social insurance is an ‘inclusive’ technology of government, in
so far as it has as its object contested notions of ‘social solidarity’ (1996a, p. 48).
These inclusive technologies of government, such as the schooling system, child
welfare practices, unemployment benefits, widows pensions, supporting parents
benefits, attempt to socialise the management of the dangers and risks associated with
competitive and uncertain labour markets, and the ‘corporeal riskiness of a body
Journal of Youth Studies 19
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subject to sickness and health’. These risks are reconfigured, within the arts of welfare
government, as being, rightfully, the responsibility of a social State.
Post-war problematisations of Liberal welfare governmentality, understood here as
signalling the emergence of (Neo)Liberal governmentalities, have witnessed new
articulations of risk, and of the rights, roles and responsibilities that attach to a range
of State agencies, non-governmental organisations, communities and individuals for
managing these risks. As we will see, these problematisations have particular
consequences for young people and their families, who emerge as being responsible
for managing a range of risks associated with schooling, employment, sexuality, diets
and peer relations.
The post-World War 2 emergence of a problematisation of Liberal welfare practices
of government is traced, within Foucault’s investigations, primarily through the work
of the German Ordoliberalen and the American Chicago School of Economics [1].
Gordon argues that, in the case of the Ordoliberalen , the problematisation of the
interventionist practices of the State ought to be situated within the historical
experience of National Socialism (1991, p. 41). Burchell (1996) argues that, for the
Ordoliberalen , National Socialism is not ‘some monstrous aberration’. Instead, the
Ordoliberalen imagine the experience of Nazism as the ‘quite inevitable outcome of a
series of anti-liberal policies’ (Burchell 1996, p. 22; original emphasis). In the
historical context of the emergence of the German nation-state, these policies include
the experience of ‘national protectionism, the welfare policies of Bismarckian State
socialism, wartime economic planning and management, and Keynesian interven-
tionism’ (Burchell 1996, p. 22). Post-war American (Neo)Liberalism emerges
primarily from the Chicago School of Economics and the work, among others, of
Milton Friedman and Frederich von Hayek. Burchell (1996) argues that while the
historical context is quite different to German post-war (Neo)Liberalism, the ‘general
form of the argument is quite similar’ [2].
Rose argues that for Hayek the ‘logics of the interventionist State’, as practised
within war time planning and regulation of the economic and the social, were
‘inefficient and self defeating’ (1996a, p. 50). Moreover, Hayek (1944, 1967) saw in
such practices the Road to Serfdom. That is, interventionist practices of government
impel the nation-state in the direction of the police state as it emerged, and would
emerge, in Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and China. Robert Heilbroner (1969)
argues that Hayek saw in National Socialism the operation of an ‘internal law’ that
emerged at a certain level of government intervention into the market order. Once
this level was reached, government ‘had no alternative but to embrace the economy in
a top-to-bottom rigid grip’ (Heilbroner 1969, p. 272). Heilbroner (1969) argues that
Hayek was not against government regulation per se . Instead Hayek’s concerns were
directed towards forms of economic regulation or planning, which were ‘char-
acterised by a peculiar inability to call a halt to itself. Once set in motion, an inner
necessity forced it to expand’ (Heilbroner 1969, p. 272; original emphasis). This logic
did not stem from the intentions or motivations of planners, bureaucrats and experts
to plan more , but rather from the inability of plans to match the contingencies,
20 P. Kelly
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failures and unplanned for aspects of human interaction in complex extended orders
(such as modern markets). In the context of these failures, this rationality of
government suggested the need for better planning, more surveillance and greater
intervention into these complex systems. For Heilbroner (1969), this logic, as Hayek
identified it, was evident in State attempts in England during the 1940s, to ‘achieve
the planned production of the nationalized coal mines’. In order to realise these
governmental ambitions,
it was necessary to introduce a plan for the recruitment of labor, and in order to
achieve the planned recruitment of labor, a planned schedule of wages had to be set
up, and in order to keep coal-mining wages at a suitable differential over other
wages, the whole national pattern of industrial pay became a matter of concern.
What had started as a simple output plan became necessarily a far wider one.
(Heilbroner 1969, p. 273)
Heilbroner argues that Hayek saw in such attempts to ‘make plans work’ a form of
rationalised planning that ‘led inexorably to what Lenin called Who Whom: who plans
whom, who directs, chooses, allocates what to whom?’ (1969, p. 273) [3]. Hayek’s
articulation of this view, at a time when other Western intellectuals were arguing that
post-Depression and war-time practices of government had demonstrated the
‘feasibility’ and desirability of a ‘central State’ governing ‘the whole of the productive
and social organization of a nation’, would emerge 30 years later in political critiques
of Western Liberal welfare governmentalities (Rose 1996a, pp. 50/51).
For Hayek (1988) the origins, and the survival, of ‘our civilization’, as a form of the
social that is able to sustain large populations and economic growth, and promote
ideals of ‘liberty, property and justice’, is dependent on what he calls ‘the extended
order of human co-operation’ facilitated by the ‘competitive market order’ (pp. 6/7).
Hayek (1988) argues that this extended form of cooperative human interaction
‘resulted not from human design or intention but spontaneously’. This extended form
of the social becomes dominant, suggests Hayek, as a consequence of processes that
‘unintentionally conform’ to various
traditional and largely moral practices, many of which men [sic] tend to dislike,
whose significance they usually fail to understand, whose validity they cannot prove,
and which have none the less fairly rapidly spread by means of an evolutionary
selection*/the comparative increase of population and wealth*/of those groups
that happened to follow them. The unwitting, reluctant, and even painful adoption of
these practices kept these groups together, increased their access to valuable
information of all sorts, and enabled them to be ‘fruitful, and multiply, and replenish
the earth and subdue it’ (Genesis 1:28). This process is perhaps the least appreciated
facet of human evolution. (Hayek 1988, p. 6; original emphasis)
In articulating a view of epistemology and ethics as ‘evolutionary’, Hayek argues that
the ‘formation’ of ‘highly complex self maintaining orders’ can only be accounted for
by processes that ‘transcend’ our ability to ‘observe all the several circumstances
operating in the determination of their particular manifestations’ (1988, p. 9). This
Journal of Youth Studies 21
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way of imagining the processes that lead to the emergence and maintenance of
extended forms of human interaction is situated in relation to a socialist
epistemology that Hayek argues is ‘wrong about the facts ’ (1988, p. 6; original
emphasis). Socialism and Liberal welfare government, for Hayek, take, as a
fundamental premise, the view that reason and rationality can be mobilised in the
design and implementation of a system of human interaction in such a way as to
provide a better, more productive, form of the social than the ‘spontaneous’ extended
order of cooperative human interaction facilitated by the competitive market order.
The conflict for Hayek between the socialist welfare State and (Neo)Liberalism is one
between, in essence, ‘those who demand deliberate arrangement of human
interaction by central authority based on collective command over available
resources’, and the ‘advocates of the spontaneous extended human order created by
a competitive market’ (1988, p. 7). Hayek argues that socialism’s position is both
‘factually impossible to achieve or execute’, and ‘logically impossible’ (1988, p. 7). For
Hayek the important issue here is socialism’s assumption that ‘since people had been
able to generate some system of rules’ governing their conducts, then, logically, ‘they
must also be able to design an even better and more gratifying system’ (1988, p. 7;
original emphasis). Here, the Fatal Conceit of socialism is, for Hayek, set against
(Neo)Liberalism’s promise that:
by following the spontaneously generated moral traditions underlying the
competitive market order (traditions which do not satisfy the canons or norms
of rationality embraced by most socialists), we generate and garner greater
knowledge and wealth than could ever be obtained or utilised in a centrally-
directed economy whose adherents claim to proceed strictly in accordance with
‘reason’. (1988, p. 7)
Hayek’s (1988) purpose is to ‘attack the presumption of reason on the part of
socialists’. Here there is a concern to construct, counter to socialism, a view of reason
(and reasoned human action) that ‘recognises its own limitations’. Further, these
limitations, learned through processes of reason, suggest, for Hayek, ‘that order
generated without design can far outstrip plans men [sic] consciously design’ (1988,
p. 8; original emphasis).
For both the American and German (Neo)Liberals, the market is no longer
imagined as a ‘spontaneous (albeit historically conditioned) quasi-natural reality’. An
attachment to this classical Liberal view would restrict governments to the practice of
laissez-faire. Within emerging (Neo)Liberal problematisations of the relations
between the State and the economy it becomes necessary for government ‘to conduct
a policy towards society such that it is possible for a market to exist and function’
(Gordon 1991, p. 41). In this emerging governmentality there is a sense that the
central problematic of government ‘is not the anti-social effects of the economic
market, but the anti-competitive effects of society’ (Gordon 1991, p. 42). The idea of
the death of the social, given expression in Margaret Thatcher’s mid-1980s
proclamation that there is no such thing as society, signals an attempt within
22 P. Kelly
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(Neo)Liberal rationalities to govern through the behaviours and dispositions of
individuals, rather than society (Rose 1996a, 1996b). Government, as it is imagined
here, ought to have as its object a furthering of ‘the game of enterprise as a pervasive
style of conduct, diffusing the enterprise-form throughout the social fabric as its
generalized principle of functioning’ (Gordon 1991, p. 42). Gordon argues that this
particular way of imagining the art and ends of government ‘proposes that the whole
ensemble of individual life be structured as the pursuit of a range of different
enterprises’ (1991, p. 42). The range of these enterprises is diverse*/from the number
of possible relations of oneself to oneself (as a reflexive project), through to the
conduct of professional, family, work and cultural relations. These relations are ‘all to
be given the ethos and structure of the enterprise-form’ (Gordon 1991, p. 42). These
governmental ambitions would have as their end modes of subjectivation that
promised to produce the entrepreneurial Self.
The imagineering of the social as a clone of the economic proceeds via processes in
which the ‘territory of economic theory’ is enlarged through a ‘series of redefinitions
of its object’ (Gordon 1991, p. 43). For Gordon this process witnesses a movement
from a neo-classical view that ‘economics concerns the study of all behaviours
involving the allocation of scarce resources’ to diverse ends, through to a view that
economics takes as its object all rational thought and action ‘entailing strategic
choices between alternative paths, means and promises’. This is a process of re-
articulation that addresses ‘the totality of human behaviour’. Imagining human
motivations, dispositions and capacities for action and thought in this manner
provides (Neo)Liberalism with a ‘purely economic method of programming the
totality of governmental action’ (Gordon 1991, p. 43). Where Hayek (1988) identifies
socialism’s Fatal Conceit in diverse attempts to rationally plan all aspects of the
economic and the social in order to facilitate the greatest common good, this
reduction of all forms of human thought and action to the realm of economic choices
by an entrepreneurial subject can be identified as (Neo)Liberalism’s own dangerous
conceit . I will return to this point in the closing section.
Gordon (1991) argues that homo economicus , as the subject of (Neo)Liberalism, is
‘both a reactivation and a radical inversion’ of the subject of Scottish Enlightenment
Liberalism. This reactivation centres on imagining human behaviours and disposi-
tions in terms of rational, choice-making man . For early Liberalism this male
pronoun was an entirely appropriate way of constructing the Subject as a ‘rational,
interest-motivated economic ego’, engaged in ‘private, individual, atomistic, egoistic’
exchange relations that emerge from a particular ‘natural and historical milieu’
(Burchell 1996, p. 24) [4]. In this sense, Liberal rationalities of government must take
as their object ‘the natural private-interest-motivated conduct of free, market
exchanging individuals’, in so far as the behaviours and dispositions of such
individuals are the foundation that ‘enables the market to function optimally in
accordance with its nature’ (Burchell 1996, p. 23; original emphasis). The ‘radical
inversion’ of this principle of Liberal rationalities of government takes a number of
forms. Gordon (1991) argues that the subject of Liberalism, originally signified a
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subject whose motivation ‘must remain forever untouchable by government’. For
(Neo)Liberalism, however, ‘homo economicus is manipulable man’, a subject who
should be forever open to and responsive to signals*/from the markets, from risks
and dangers, from opportunities. Within this way of thinking the subject, ‘economic
government joins hands with behaviourism’ (Gordon 1991, p. 43). This articulation
works to construct a view of the subject as an ‘individual producer-consumer’ who, in
certain quite fundamentally new ways is ‘not just an enterprise, but the entrepreneur
of himself or herself ’ (Gordon 1991, p. 44).
Where the meanings of life are transformed, largely autonomously, into meanings
that are structured by the market form, then the subjects of (Neo)Liberal rationalities
of government emerge as ‘free’, ‘entrepreneurial’, competitive, and economically
rational individuals. However, within these changed problematics of government, this
‘form is not so much a given of human nature as a consciously contrived style of
conduct’ (Burchell 1996, pp. 23/24). That is, this subject has to be engineered via the
mobilisation of diverse techniques, as the active, autonomous, responsible entrepre-
neur of his/her own Do-It-Yourself project of the Self (Beck 1992). Rose (1996a) argues
that the subject, in this sense, is conceived as an active, self-creating individual seeking
to ‘enterprise’ herself or himself. Individual biographical projects are the result, within
this rationality, of the ‘maximization’ of the chances for a ‘good life’ through ‘acts of
choice’. Life is accorded ‘meaning and value to the extent that it can be rationalized as
the outcome of choices made or choices to be made’ (Rose 1996a, p. 57).
Burchell, for instance, argues that emerging (Neo)Liberal practices of government
‘offer’ individuals, groups and communities new opportunities to participate actively
in various arenas of action ‘to resolve the kind of issues hitherto held to be the
responsibility of authorized governmental agencies’ (1996, p. 29). Thus the
widespread privatisation of formerly public areas of responsibility*/crime prevention
(Crime Stoppers), the management of schools, the management of health services
systems, the regulation and care of the Self as an enterprise*/can be conceived as
constituting new forms of ‘responsibilization’. Here, individuals, groups and
communities are ‘encouraged freely and rationally, to conduct themselves ’ (Burchell
19996, p. 29; emphasis added). However, as Burchell argues, the ‘contractual
implication’ of these processes is that individuals and communities ‘must assume
active responsibility for these activities, both for carrying them out, and of course, for
their outcomes’ (1996, p. 29). Furthermore, these processes of ‘responsibilization’, as
institutionally dependent processes of individualisation and standardisation , incite
and encourage the ‘individual as enterprise’ to ‘conduct themselves in accordance
with the appropriate (or approved) model of action’ (Burchell 1996, p. 29).
In the following sections I will argue that Youth at-risk illustrate, in their negativity,
the ways in which the entrepreneurial Self is positively imagined and dominates the
horizons of Western identity at the turn of the century. Importantly, I will argue that
this historically located figure is imagined in ways that provoke the attention, and
intervention, of an array of governmental authorities*/who draw on hybridised,
psychologically based knowledges*/so that members of this populations can, it is
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promised, develop the capacity to conduct themselves, imagine themselves, as being
responsible for the maintenance of themselves as an enterprise, in an ongoing, never-
ending project of self reflection and self actualisation.
Youth at-risk: The Promise of the Entrepreneurial Self Jeopardised
I have argued elsewhere (Kelly 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001a, 2001b, 2003) that the
questions of Youth, of what to do with them, of how to school them, or police them,
or regulate them, or house them, or employ them, or prevent them from becoming
involved in any number of risky*/sexual, eating, drug (ab)using or peer cultural*/
practices are questions that have a substantial historical aspect. In the Liberal
democracies at the turn of the millennium, the crisis of Youth at-risk is a key marker
in debates about Youth among intellectuals, social commentators, politicians,
bureaucrats, religious groups, (self-appointed) moral guardians and experts in
various domains of expertise. Swadener and Lubeck (1995), for instance, claim
that in the United States between 1989 and 1995 over 2500 articles and conference
papers focused on the issue of children, families and Youth at-risk. They further claim
that the narrative of at-risk structured ‘countless’ school district, State and Federal
task forces that addressed the ‘crisis’ of America’s Youth (see also Withers & Batten
1995 and Batten & Russell 1995 for reviews of the extensive Youth at-risk literature
from the United States, Canada, Britain and Australia). The truth of Youth at-risk
rehearses, in part, the historical truths of Youth as delinquent, deviant and
disadvantaged (Swadener & Lubeck 1995). However, a historically novel aspect of
the truth of Youth at-Risk is that, potentially, every behaviour, every practice, every
group of young people can be imagined in terms of risk (Tait 1995).
What are young people at risk of not becoming? What forms of identity are they at
risk of not performing? What might be the grounds on which concerns with
particular forms of identity be constructed? Youth at-risk; the behaviours and
dispositions that position Youth at-risk; the forms of future adult personhood placed
at risk by these present behaviours and dispositions; and the forms of institutiona-
lised, intellectually grounded knowledge that generate discourses of risk around
certain, ideal, constructions of human identity become central concerns in this
genealogy of the entrepreneurial Self.
Discourses of Youth at-risk mobilise a form of probabilistic thinking, about certain
preferred or ideal adult futures and the present behaviours and dispositions of Youth.
This sort of probabilistic thinking attempts to construct statistically valid, causal
relationships between these different configurations of time and space, between these
different constructions of adolescent and adult. Discourses of Youth at-risk, and of
the behaviours and dispositions (risk factors) that place young people at risk, are, in
this sense, constructions of the array of psychological, cultural and sociological
systems of thought that imagine the adult Self as an entrepreneurial Self. These
systems of thought generate discourses that seek to tell the truth of Youth at-risk.
These truths concern the manner in which present behaviours and dispositions place
Journal of Youth Studies 25
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desirable future outcomes at risk. The truth of Youth at-risk is thus grounded in a
narrative of Youth as becoming, as being a space of transition from childhood to
adulthood, as a space that, potentially, jeopardises the emergence of an entrepreneur-
ial subject. In this sense Youth is imagined largely in terms of a discursive terrain
moulded by the history of developmental psychology*/and by the attempts of
sociological and anthropological discourses to engage these truths (Hall 1904,
Springhall 1986, Mead 2001).
Such a view of Youth is to be found, for instance, in John Freeland’s (1991, 1992,
1996) identification of those factors that place this transitional process at risk for
certain populations of young people. Freeland’s (1991) commissioned report for the
Autralian Education Council (Finn) Review Committee (1991) of young people’s
participation in Australian post-compulsory education and training, underpins much
of the discussion in Chapter 7 of the review*/‘Participation in Education and
Training by the Disadvantaged’. In that chapter there is a special focus on the factors
affecting the ‘educational participation’ of a ‘sub-group of the ‘‘at risk’’ population’; a
group who are ‘classified as deeply disadvantaged’. Here, Aboriginal youth, young
people from Non English Speaking Backgrounds, ‘some’ young women, homeless
youth, long-term unemployed young people, young people in ‘isolated communities’,
young offenders and disabled young people are constructed as identifiable, distinct
populations of Youth at-risk (Freeland 1992, p. 134). Such populations exhibit a
range of characteristics that predispose their members to the possibility of not being
able to enterprise themselves*/hence these young people become the target for a
range of interventions designed to encourage the emergence of an entrepreneurial
Selfhood. Citing Coleman and Husen’s (1985) OECD report Becoming Adult in a
Changing Society, Freeland (1996) imagines Youth as a ‘stage of life between
childhood and adulthood’. Childhood is identified with ‘physiological immaturity,
emotional and economic dependence and primary ties with parents and siblings’.
Adulthood, in this view, is framed in terms of ‘physiological maturity, emotional and
economic autonomy, and by primary ties with the adult partner and children’. Youth,
as a transitional process, involves attempts to resolve ‘a range of questions relating to
personal morality, sexuality, politics and economics, all of which contribute to one’s
personal identity’ (Freeland 1996, p. 7). Youth is thus a ‘process of simultaneously
‘‘un-becoming’’ a child and becoming an adult’. Colthart covers similar terrain when
he cites a Western Australian Government report on Youth Affairs that positions
Youth as being at-risk ‘if their life circumstances threaten physical, psychological or
emotional well-being and preclude or limit the normative developmental experiences
necessary to achieve healthy adult functioning’ (1996, p. 31). The ‘major categories of
risk factors’ that jeopardise the achievement of, or transition to, ‘healthy adult
functioning’ include
failure to complete Year 10: unemployment or being in marginal or insecure
employment: engagement in behaviour likely to bring one into the criminal justice
system: engagement in unsafe health practices: and being subject to a family
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environment which fails to provide adequate safety and/or fails to convey a sense of
self-worth. (Colthart 1996, pp. 31/32)
Freeland’s (1996) construction of at-risk and ‘vulnerable’ populations of young
people rests on identifying and quantifying a range of factors that place at risk those
young people unable to ‘effect’ a ‘secure transition to adulthood’. Freeland (1996)
argues that Youth emerges as a transitional ‘stage of life’ in the context of post-Second
World War changes in the patterns of teenage participation in education and the
labour market. For the ‘vast majority’ of young people who were becoming adult in
the 1950s and 1960s, the ‘transition to adult independence occurred after the
completion of ten years of schooling and with a trouble free entry to the labour
market’ (Freeland 1996, p. 7). The ‘long term structural collapse of the teenage full-
time labour market’ since the 1960s has, argues Freeland (1996), ‘severely dislocated’
the process and experience of transition for all young people. This dislocation is,
however, not ‘uniform’, and is marked by a complex of ‘interrelated social divisions
based on class, gender, race, ethnicity and region’. This ‘combination of factors’,
Freeland suggests, places a ‘significant proportion of teenagers at risk of not effecting
a secure transition to adulthood’ (1996, p. 7).
From a position on the Left (broadly defined) Freeland (1996) stresses the
importance of seeing the problem of at-risk Youth in ‘structural’ terms. That is, in
terms of structural changes in labour markets, curriculum restructuring around notions
of ‘quality and relevance’, structured training and entry level employment opportunities
for young people, and in terms of institutionally patterned relations of (dis)advantage
in which class, gender, ethnicity, geography, and disability structure life options and
choices (Freeland 1996, pp. 9/11). Yet Freeland’s (1996) construction of at-risk Youth is
an instance of Left intellectual practice that unproblematically rehearses the historical
construction of disadvantaged (at-risk) Youth in terms of lack and deficit . Disadvan-
taged, at grave risk Youth, Freeland argues, ‘have access to fewer cultural resources and
life cycle opportunities’ which they might mobilise in their ‘search for solutions to the
problems of identity and transition’ (1996, p. 11). In this view the ‘richer the socio-
economic and socio-cultural resources the broader the array of phenomena included in
the analysis and understanding, the wider the range of possible courses of action
available to the individual and the cultural group’ (Freeland 1996, p. 11).
Imagining Youth at-risk in terms of deficit provokes a range of interventionist
regimes that take as their object the transformation of the cultural resources of the
disadvantaged*/a transformation that has as its end the development of an
entrepreneurial Subject.
A Game Without End . . . Ongoing Mediations on Who we Should Become
Opening in Greenock, a rundown town near Glasgow, ‘Sweet Sixteen’ follows
teenage scally Liam . . . as he struggles to prepare for the release of his ex-heroin
addict mum from prison.
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Desperate to try and build them a proper family home, Liam needs money. And
fast. Muscling in on his mum’s boyfriend’s drug business, Liam and his pal
Pinball . . . set themselves up as dealers, displaying an entrepreneurial skill that has
little other outlet on Glasgow’s unemployment-ridden estates.
Taking place in the shadow of the closed-down shipbuilding yards, ‘Sweet Sixteen’
rages against the callousness of a capitalist system which abandons its workers.
As Liam works his way up through the ranks of the local underworld, director Ken
Loach and screenwriter Paul Laverty put an ironic spin on the Thatcherite ethos of
entrepreneurial self-help. Liam’s astute business sense (in one hilarious scene, he
convinces the local pizza delivery boys to work as his drug couriers) is an insightful
inversion of the very forces that have crushed this community. (Russell 2002)
A form of ethical self-problematisation that has as its object the development of a
certain capacity to conduct oneself as an enterprise has come to dominate the
horizons of identity in contemporary Anglo-European settings. In these settings, the
ethic of enterprise tends to assume that adult personhood should take this general
form. This discussion has drawn on Foucaultian genealogies of (Neo)Liberalism and
the Self to argue that the figure of Youth at-risk, in its negativity, illustrates the extent
to which personhood in the Anglo European democracies has, increasingly, come to
be imagined, in a positive sense, in terms of the entrepreneurial Self.
This discussion has presented a partial account of an ethics of the entrepreneurial
Self. This analysis could have been framed, just as readily, by a reading, for example,
of the emergence of a so-called Third Way social democratic political project in the
United Kingdom, United States or Australia*/a project with a number of central
themes including the promotion of the concept of life-long learning. The idea, and
the obligation, of life-long learning is positioned as a primary objective of a Third
Way agenda as it is the ‘one public process dedicated to preparing people for the
inevitability of change*/developing new skills in the workplace, plus the habits of
trust and tolerance in society’. The ‘New Economy’ and the ‘New Politics’, in this
sense, demands of its Subjects a ‘richness of lifelong learning and self improvement’
(Latham 2001, p. 20).
The dominance of the entrepreneurial Self is not reducible, however, to a particular
political ideology, or the project of a single political movement/party. It is also not the
only form of personhood imaginable in these times. It emerges and dominates the
horizons of identity not from a single point of origin, but rather from a past (near
and distant) and a present in which social, political, economic and knowledge
processes tend to ‘profit’ the ‘industrial and business classes of society’; the new
prophets of an ‘enterprise culture’ who (re)emerge as the ‘keepers of the moral
conscience and guardians, inter alia, of our education system’ (Hall 1988, p. 4).
It is not that ‘initiative’, ‘enterprise’, ‘responsibility’ or ‘activity’ are not worthwhile
human capacities. It would be difficult to imagine any form of human achievement
without these characteristics. Rather, it is that within the frame of an entrepreneurial
Selfhood, as it is imagined at the turn of the second millennium CE, ‘initiative’,
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‘enterprise’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘activity’ are narrowly imagined in relation to the
performance of exchange relations in the extended order of capitalist markets*/of all
sorts. Moreover, it is a concern that these markets*/characterised always by the
possibility and promise of greed, deception, monopoly, winners and losers,
inequities*/also, at this time, penetrate all aspects of human being in the world
(reproduction, sex, organ transplants, education, health, unemployment, services for
the poor, aid, life management, futures, etc.) in a digitally enhanced, globalised
market space. And we must all assume an entrepreneurial disposition to this life
form. We fail to do so at our own risk.
Stuart Hall (1988) is instructive in understanding the problems and limitations
associated with imagining the Self in the terms demanded by this ethic of enterprise.
In the context of a prolonged and reflexive engagement with the Thatcherite political
project, Hall argues that Thatcherism and its transformation of the problematics of
government was, in some quite ‘obvious and undeniable ways’, structured by
attempts; to ‘restore the prerogatives of ownership and profitability’; to produce the
‘political conditions for capital to operate more effectively’; and to attempt to
encourage a culture underpinned by a view that there is ‘no measure of the good life
other than ‘‘value for money’’’ (1988, p. 4). In this context Hall cites Marx on Jeremy
Bentham’s Utilitarianism, as a measure of the New Utilitarianism that Hall sees as
dominating the culture encouraged by Thatcherism. For Marx, Bentham ‘takes the
modern [nineteenth-century] shopkeeper, especially the English shopkeeper as the
normal man. Whatever is useful for this queer normal man, and to his world, is
absolutely useful. This yard-measure, then, he applies to past, present and future’
(cited in Hall 1988, p. 4).
From a different perspective, John Hinkson (1995) critiques Hayek’s benign , naive ,
commitment to the unfettered extended order of the market, suggesting that the
market order deconstructs and decentres more concrete, face-to-face forms of
association. Moreover, argues Hinkson, the extended order becomes radicalised
within contemporary techno-cultural processes producing more dangerous possibi-
lities for (bio genetic) social engineering than that which Hayek critiques in the
practise of socialism.
What is at stake in this game without end are ongoing struggles over who we
should become. The game, therefore, has a range of often profound consequences for
the lives of individuals, groups and populations*/outcomes that are not, by any
means, of equal consequence to these individuals and populations. Political invention
is an ongoing process and concern*/a process that should involve looking back and
forward. A key task in these processes might be to imagine such things as obligations,
responsibilities and personhood in ways that are different to those that are currently
imagined within the framework of the entrepreneurial Self. These practices of
invention would acknowledge that many of the processes that shape different life
choices, chances and courses at the individual and local level are structured by global
processes*/and by some quite fundamental ‘human forces of greed and exploita-
tion . . . complacency, prejudice and hypocrisy’ (Rose 1999, p. 491). Acknowledging
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these other aspects of personhood, and the processes and relations of power that
shape personhood, might suggest that ‘initiative’, ‘enterprise’, ‘responsibility’ or
‘activity’ are not unproblematic characteristics of personhood. Indeed, they are not
the only, and not necessarily the most appropriate, markers of who it is that we
should become.
Notes
[1] The Ordoliberalen are so named through their involvement in the journal Ordo (Gordon
1991).
[2] One measure of Hayek’s influence in the emergence of post-war (Neo)Liberal problematisa-
tions of the practice of government is found in the jacket notes from his The Fatal Conceit
(1988). Here Hayek is described, in part, as being the ‘ideological mentor for the Reagan and
Thatcher ‘‘revolutions’’’.
[3] See also Hayek (1967).
[4] Nancy Fraser (1989), and Fraser and Linda Gordon (1994) have argued that this view of the
Subject, as masculine, as rational choice-making homo economicus , underpinned the
development of Liberal Welfare practices of government. Such practices most often position
women and children in relations of dependence to this Subject.
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